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Does section 420A impose ‘strict liability’ upon  
controllers for acts or omissions of agents and experts? 
 
Mark Wellard∗ 
 
 
This article addresses in depth the question of whether section 420A of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) imposes ‘strict liability’ upon a controller for the failure of an agent or expert to 
take reasonable care.  The weight of existing authority appears to suggest that controllers 
are liable under s 420A for the carelessness of their agents or expert advisers.  However, a 
closer analysis of the text of the provision and relevant Australian and UK case law 
demonstrates that this aspect of the statutory construction of s 420A remains very much an 
open question.  This article ultimately contends for a construction of s 420A which requires a 
controller to adequately supervise and scrutinise, but which does not render a blameless 
controller strictly liable for all careless acts and omissions of agents and expert advisers.        
 
 
I  Introduction 
 
A former High Court Justice concluded a recent article on statutory interpretation by stating:  
 
Text, context and purpose (policy) these three.  But the greatest of these is text. Yet context 
and purpose are often needed to throw a satisfactory light on the text itself, which, viewed 
without these, may lead the legal traveller into error.1 
 
It is broadly accepted that a controller cannot merely delegate his or her duty under s 420A of 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to take all reasonable care to obtain market value (or the 
best price obtainable in the circumstances) when exercising a power of sale. 
 
However, it is less clear whether a controller is ‘strictly liable’2 for the defaults of an agent 
engaged to assist with a sale process – that is, whether a controller is liable for all and any 
acts or omissions of an agent which (through no fault of the controller) fall short of the 
standard of care required by s 420A.  If on a proper construction of s 420A a controller is not 
strictly liable for all negligent acts or omissions of an agent, where then is the line drawn? If 
mere delegation to a competent agent is not enough to discharge a controller’s s 420A duty, 
will diligent instruction and/or supervision of the agent and the sale process generally be 
sufficient?       
 
With all the care, supervision and diligence in the world, a controller who has engaged an 
agent cannot guarantee a default-free sale process.  If s 420A imposes a duty on a controller 
                                                 
∗ Lecturer, QUT School of Law.  The author would like to acknowledge the generous assistance of Dr Bill 
Dixon (QUT School of Law) and the anonymous referee in providing comments on an earlier draft of this article.  
Naturally, the views expressed in this article (and any errors) are the author’s own.      
1 The Hon Michael Kirby AC CMG,‘Statutory Interpretation: The Meaning of Meaning’(2011) 35 Melbourne 
University Law Review 113 at 133. 
2 The term ‘strict liability’ is used to describe the imposition of ‘no fault’ liability upon a blameless person for 
the careless acts or omissions of another. 
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to ensure that an agent does not behave carelessly, does the provision require the 
impossible?3    
 
Case law is bereft of detailed consideration of the question.  Courts dealing with the issue in 
the context of s 420A have taken firm guidance from the High Court authority of Commercial 
and General Acceptance Ltd v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 (‘CGA v Nixon’) and appear to 
have afforded s 420A something of a ‘strict liability’ construction.  Courts appear to have 
accepted CGA v Nixon as authority for the general proposition that the defaults of agents and 
experts should be attributed to the relevant controller for the purposes of s 420A.  However, it 
can be argued that this is a simplistic (or plainly wrong) application of CGA v Nixon given 
that the High Court in that case construed a Queensland statutory provision which was similar 
to s 420A but cast in materially different language. 
 
The proper construction of s 420A is very much an open question in determining whether the 
provision imposes strict liability for an agent’s carelessness.  In answering this question it is 
instructive to refer to the general law which continues to operate alongside s 420A as well as 
recent High Court authority addressing the vexed question of ‘non-delegable’ duties.  Against 
that background, it is contended that s 420A cannot be construed as imposing general strict 
liability upon a controller for the faults of an agent or contractor where the receiver or 
mortgagee has reasonably supervised and scrutinised the work or advice of that agent or 
contractor.  A controller cannot discharge or delegate its personal s 420A duty by merely 
exercising reasonable care in the engagement of a competent agent.  However, it is contended 
that s 420A does not require a controller to ensure or guarantee that a reasonably-engaged 
agent or contractor is never careless.    
 
II  The duty imposed by s 420A and the use of agents or experts in 
exercising a power of sale 
 
Section 420A imposes a duty upon ‘controllers’ (which includes mortgagees in possession 
and receivers)4 to take all reasonable care to sell security property for market value or the 
best price reasonably obtainable in the circumstances.  Prudence and diligence often demand 
that a controller seek the assistance of an expert agent when selling security property.5  While 
much of the case law and commentary dealing with s 420A has focussed on the question of 
‘market value’ and the standard of care required to discharge the duty, the responsibility of 
controllers for their agents’ acts is not entirely clear (as a matter of principle) from the ad hoc 
judicial consideration of the issue.  
 
CGA v Nixon features heavily in the line of decisions which have leaned towards a ‘strict 
liability’ construction of s 420A.  These authorities have generally refuted any suggestion that 
controllers can seek to absolve themselves of liability for a deficient sale process by a 
‘reasonable’ reliance upon competent (or expert) agents.   
 
It is arguable that CGA v Nixon has been misapplied in this context, given that it was a 
decision which focussed squarely on the proper construction of s 85 of the Property Law Act 
1974 (Qld).  Contrary to the tenor of several judicial statements, the Queensland provision is 
                                                 
3 The nature of the ‘impossible’ non-delegable duty (in the tortious context) was discussed by Gleeson CJ in 
Leichhardt MC v Montgomery (2007) 230 CLR 22 at [23]. 
4 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 9. 
5 Jeogla Pty Ltd v ANZ Banking Group [1999] NSWSC 563; CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 524 
(Brennan J).  
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not identical to s 420A.6  When one revisits the decision in CGA v Nixon, it is clear that the 
High Court’s reasoning very much turned on specific language of s 85 (the Queensland 
provision) which is not in fact replicated in s 420A.  Section 85 of the Property Law Act 1974 
(Qld) imposes a duty on a mortgagee exercising a power of sale to take reasonable care ‘to 
ensure’ that the property is sold at the market value.  The words ‘to ensure’ are notably absent 
in s 420A despite having originally appeared in the Harmer Report draft provision (discussed 
further below).  The significance of this statutory language in the High Court’s reasoning in 
CGA v Nixon appears to have been overlooked by judges and commentators alike.  
 
Therefore, it is instructive to commence an analysis of this aspect of s 420A with a return to 
the ratio of the High Court in CGA v Nixon.  
 
III  Revisiting the High Court’s decision in CGA v Nixon 
 
In CGA v Nixon, a case dealing with s 85 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), the High Court 
was presented with the very question this paper raises in respect of s 420A today: that is, was 
a mortgagee (bank) responsible for the defaults of its sale agent when exercising a power of 
sale?  Putting it another way, to what extent was the mortgagee’s statutory duty ‘delegable’?  
 
The trial judge had found that the mortgagee’s agent had adequately advertised locally but 
insufficiently in the relevant state-wide newspaper (The Courier Mail).  The manager of the 
mortgagee had instructed the agents to advertise in The Courier Mail but this was only done 
once (two days before the auction) and not in the issue of the newspaper which usually 
advertised real estate auctions.  It was not challenged on the appeal that the negligence was 
that of the agents.  The question was whether the mortgagee should be held responsible.7  
 
In holding the mortgagee liable for the failings of its agent, most of the High Court justices 
placed weight upon the precise terms of the duty imposed by s 85 upon a mortgagee – that is, 
to take reasonable care ‘to ensure’ that the property was sold at market value. 
 
When CGA v Nixon was decided the Australian general law position was more unsettled as to 
whether the standard of care required of a mortgagee exercising a power of sale mirrored that 
in the UK – that is, whether the Australian general law imposed upon a mortgagee a duty of 
reasonable care akin to negligence (as in the UK), or rather a mere equitable obligation of 
good faith.  As the case was one which fell for determination under s 85 of the Queensland 
statute, it was not necessary to decide this question of reconciliation of the Australian and UK 
general law (though the UK general law would prove relevant to the High Court’s 
construction of the statute).  
 
In separate and substantive judgments Gibbs CJ and Aickin, Wilson, Brennan and Mason JJ 
all decided that the mortgagee could not absolve itself of responsibility for the inadequate 
advertising by merely having acted reasonably in delegating the task to and/or instructing a 
competent agent.  However, the reasoning of the High Court justices varied in aspects of 
approach and emphasis.  Generally, the High Court concluded that a proper construction of s 
                                                 
6 In Investec Bank v Glodale (2009) 24 VR 617 at [42] the court held that ‘the duty under either provision 
should be regarded as the same’.  In Jeogla Pty Ltd v ANZ Banking Group [1999] NSWSC 563 at [423] Einstein 
J stated that the two provisions were ‘close to word perfect’. 
7 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 500 (Mason J). 
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85 was that a mortgagee was not merely required to take reasonable care in a general sense, 
but to make sure that market value is achieved.8  
 
As will be discussed below, the nuances of the separate judgments delivered in CGA v Nixon 
have not been fully acknowledged or appreciated by courts purporting to apply CGA v Nixon 
to s 420A.  This has resulted in a lack of clarity of principle, making it difficult to determine 
whether a controller is ‘strictly liable’ for the carelessness of an agent or contractor engaged 
to assist with the sale of security property.   
 
It is therefore instructive to refer at some length to the respective judgments delivered by the 
High Court members in CGA v Nixon (discussed in the order which lends itself to analysis 
and comparison).  
 
Mason J stated:  
 
The duty imposed by the sub-section is specific. It requires “reasonable care” to be taken “to 
ensure” that the property is sold at the market value; it is not a mere duty to take reasonable 
care in a general sense. In this context the concept or standard of “reasonable care” is not 
satisfied by the mortgagee's delegation of the function to a real estate agent reputed to be 
competent. In the circumstances the standard of reasonable care expected of the mortgagee 
extends to the making of such arrangements as will ensure that the sale is properly 
advertised.9 
 
Aickin J stated: 
  
The word “ensure” has a number of recognized meanings, or perhaps synonyms; the relevant 
ones given by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary are: to warrant, to guarantee, to make 
certain. Each is concerned with the production of a result not with the means of doing so. 
Section 85(1) appears to me to be clearly directed to the production of a result, ie that the 
property is sold at the market value. If a mortgagee (whether an individual or a corporation) 
were to instruct an employee to take all the appropriate steps for the sale of the mortgaged 
property, he would undoubtedly be liable to the mortgagor if the negligent conduct of the sale 
produced a figure less than the market value. Does the engagement of an apparently qualified 
estate agent to conduct the sale discharge the duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the 
market value is obtained? In this statutory context it appears to me that the duty to take 
reasonable care cannot be delegated to an agent any more than it can be delegated to an 
employee, so as to relieve the mortgagee from the statutory duty.10 
 
 
Wilson J characterised the duty as one which could not be ‘merely’ delegated to another 
person:  
 
The duty is laid on the mortgagee, and no one else. It is a duty to take reasonable care to 
“ensure”, that is to say, to make sure that market value is achieved (cf per Vaisey J in 
Reliance Permanent Building Society v Harwood-Stamper [1944] 1 Ch 362 at 373). Sub-
section (3) confers on a person damnified by a breach of the duty a remedy in damages 
against the mortgagee. Sub-section (5) makes plain the legislative intention that the 
mortgagee should not be able to escape from the duty which the section imposes upon him. In 
the light of these provisions, it seems to me to follow that the duty imposed on the mortgagee 
                                                 
8 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 505 (Mason J), 521 (Wilson J), 524 (Brennan J). 
9 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 505 (Mason J). 
10 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 508 (Aickin J). 
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is one which he cannot delegate to another person. In my opinion, it clearly evokes the 
principle which was stated by Latham CJ in Torette House Pty Ltd v Berkman (1940) 62 CLR 
637 at 647: “Further, if a person is himself bound to perform a particular duty, he cannot 
escape liability for failure to perform that duty by delegating performance of it to another 
person”; cf also Mason J in Stoneman v Lyons (1975) 133 CLR 550 at 574; 8 ALR 173 at 
191–2.11   
Brennan J interpreted the s 85 duty as ‘non-delegable’ but this was not to say that the duty 
could not be discharged by the mortgagee with (or through) the assistance or engagement 
of agents or contractors.  Rather, the duty was held to be non-delegable in the sense that 
‘mere’ delegation to a competent agent was not of itself sufficient to discharge or perform 
the duty and that, furthermore, where an agent is used the mortgagee cannot escape 
ultimate responsibility (under s 85) for that agent’s carelessness.  In this regard Brennan J 
stated:  
The mortgagee cannot relieve himself of the duty by asking another to assume it. 
Nevertheless, there is no reason why the duty cannot be performed by the acts of another who 
is engaged to do what the duty requires to be done. It is the duty, not its performance, which 
is personal to the mortgagee.12  
 
Brennan J then concluded:  
 
The duty is defined in terms which look to the result of its performance — a sale at market 
value — and the phrase “reasonable care to ensure” describes what is to be done to effect that 
result. The duty relates to the acts which are to be done, not to the appointment of a person to 
do them. I would therefore construe s 85(1) as imposing upon the mortgagee a duty to do 
what ought reasonably to be done to ensure a sale at market value, though he is at liberty to 
perform the duty by the hands of others. If an omission is made in doing what ought 
reasonably to be done to ensure a sale at market value, the duty is not performed, and it is 
immaterial that the omission was made by another upon whom the mortgagee relied to do it. 
Although it may have been entirely reasonable — or even necessary — for the mortgagee to 
rely upon another to do the omitted act, that circumstance does not establish that the 
mortgagee's duty was performed.13  
Gibbs CJ did not place great weight on the words ‘to ensure’ in s 85.  His Honour the Chief 
Justice found that the existing UK authorities supported the conclusion that:  
[i]t may be accepted that in the present case the appellant took reasonable care to choose 
competent agents, and then left the conduct of the sale in their hands. In my opinion this 
does not mean that the appellant thereby discharged its duty under s 85(1). The duty of the 
mortgagee is not merely to take care to ensure that the sale is carried out by competent 
agents. It is to take reasonable care to ensure that the property is sold at the market value. 
The duty to take reasonable care is one that the mortgagee is bound to perform, and he 
cannot escape liability for a breach of that duty by delegation to another. In other words, 
generally speaking at least, a mortgagee does not discharge his duty to take reasonable care 
simply by choosing a competent agent and then entrusting the conduct of the sale entirely 
to him. A reasonable man, selling his own property by auction, and wishing to obtain the 
market value, would not allow the auctioneers a free hand to advertise in whatever manner 
they thought fit; he would make reasonable endeavours to ensure that the advertising 
                                                 
11 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 521 (Wilson J). 
12 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 524 (Brennan J). 
13 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 524 (Brennan J). 
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proposed was adequate. It is not unduly burdensome to require a mortgagee to exercise 
similar care.14  
Gibbs CJ also stated:  
I consider that the words of the sub-section impose on a mortgagee exercising a power of 
sale a duty higher than merely to select a proper person to carry out the sale. The duty is to 
take reasonable care to ensure that the property is sold at the market value, and the 
mortgagee does not discharge that duty simply by delegating it to another, whether that 
other be an agent or an independent contractor.15 
Significantly (and discussed further below), the High Court considered that its construction 
of s 85 of the Queensland statute was ‘reinforced’ by a line of UK authorities (originating 
in the 19th century) in which courts had upheld in equity the ‘non-delegability’ of the 
mortgagee’s duty in effecting a sale.  However, notwithstanding this recognition of the 
common law position, it is evident that the High Court placed significant weight upon the 
peculiar statutory language of the Queensland provision.  Therefore, it is contended that 
CGA v Nixon cannot be slavishly applied as determinative authority for a ‘strict liability’ 
construction of s 420A.  However, this is what appears to have transpired (at least if 
subsequent judicial statements are to be taken at face value).   
IV  The difference between the Queensland provision and s 420A 
It is instructive to set out the Queensland provision (as it then was) and s 420A together for 
comparative reference:  
Section 85(1) Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) (as considered in CGA v Nixon) 
It is the duty of a mortgagee, in the exercise after the commencement of this Act of a power 
of sale conferred by the instrument of mortgage or by this or any other Act, to take 
reasonable care to ensure that the property is sold at the market value. (emphasis added)  
Section 420A(1) Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
In exercising a power of sale in respect of property of a corporation, a controller must take all 
reasonable care to sell the property for:  
 (a) if, when it is sold, it has a market value – not less than that market value; or 
(b) otherwise–the best price that is reasonably obtainable, having regard to the circumstances 
existing when the property is sold.    
V  The legacy of CGA v Nixon: section 420A case law and commentary 
regarding liability for agents’ defaults 
CGA v Nixon has clearly influenced the construction of s 420A when the question of a 
controller’s liability for an agent’s default has arisen.   
Case law subsequent to CGA v Nixon 
                                                 
14 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 495 (Gibbs CJ). 
15 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 498 (Gibbs CJ). 
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In Jeogla v ANZ (1999) 150 FLR 359 (‘Jeogla’) Einstein J of the NSW Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of delegation of the s 420A duty to agents.  In that case (famously 
remembered for the flawed sale of cattle) the receiver claimed ‘to have discharged his 
statutory duty by delegating the duty to the agents retained to advise in relation to and to 
act on the sale of the cattle’.16  Einstein J rejected that claim of delegation in light of the 
High Court’s decision in CGA v Nixon, stating that ‘s 420A is close to word perfect with s 
85(1) of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld)’. 17  Promisingly, a section of Einstein J’s 
judgment was entitled ‘Whether, and to what extent, a receiver may defer to the advice of 
an expert’.  However, ultimately His Honour did not answer this question as a general 
matter of principle.  Einstein J summarised the various judgments delivered in CGA v 
Nixon, placing particular weight upon the dicta of Mason J:  
Mason J, while observing that the mortgagee was a finance company, being an 
institutionalised lender experienced in the sale of properties, made the point that: “. . . it is 
not unreasonable to require mortgagees generally, whether experienced or not, to bear the 
responsibility of seeing that adequate steps are taken to ensure that property is sold at the 
market value”.  These observations have particular significance in assessing the receiver's 
conduct in the present case. As will appear from what follows, the receiver's claim to have 
discharged his statutory duty by delegating the duty to the agents retained to advise in 
relation to and to act on the sale of the cattle is rejected.18 
Einstein J did not state that a receiver is always liable for an agent’s defaults.  However, 
His Honour did find that in the case before him the receiver had clearly not done enough to 
discharge his duty:   
The obligation imposed by s420A(1)(a) is one which, in the circumstances of this case, was 
not discharged by the receiver, who involved himself in analysing the advice which he 
received and who in important respects, failed to ensure that the advice was carried out.19 
It appears that Einstein J found significant personal fault or culpability on the part of the 
receiver.  Therefore, in the final analysis Jeogla was not a case where ‘strict liability’ under s 
420A was imposed upon the receiver for the acts of an agent.  For that reason, Jeogla is of 
little authoritative value on the question of whether a blameless receiver will be liable for the 
blunders of an expert, agent or contractor engaged in the exercise of a power of sale.    
 
The Jeogla decision also demonstrates the unhelpful conflation of the terms ‘expert’ and 
‘agent’.  Jeogla was an instance of purported delegation to ‘expert’ agents but Einstein J 
sought to apply or take guidance from CGA v Nixon, a decision which did not involve expert 
advice but was rather a case of a failure by the mortgagee to ensure that instructions to an 
agent (regarding advertising) were followed.  As will be contended below, this is an 
important factual distinction which may affect the construction and application of s 420A in 
any given set of circumstances.  
 
In Florgale Uniforms Pty Ltd (rec & mgr appt)(in liq) v Orders (2004) 11 VR 54 (‘Florgale 
Uniforms’) a receiver and bank were sued for, inter alia, breaching s 420A by realising a 
corporate group’s specialised stock at auction rather than by sale to existing customers.  On 
the face of the judgment, the case does not appear to be one where the central ‘negligence’ in 
                                                 
16 Jeogla v ANZ (1999) 150 FLR 359 at [437] (Einstein J). 
17 Jeogla v ANZ (1999) 150 FLR 359 at [423] (Einstein J). 
18 Jeogla v ANZ (1999) 150 FLR 359 at [436]–[437] (Einstein J). 
19 Jeogla v ANZ (1999) 150 FLR 359 at [480] (Einstein J). 
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issue was that committed by agents (though auctioneers were engaged to deliver advice to the 
receiver as to the preparation and conduct of the auction).  Rather, the chief complaints were 
made in relation to the receiver’s own judgments in realising the stock.  However, in the 
course of rejecting the s 420A claim, Dodds-Streeton J undertook the exercise of stating the 
‘relevant legislation and legal principles’ and appeared to endorse something close to a ‘strict 
liability’ construction of s 420A: 
It is established that a mortgagee in exercising the power of sale is liable for the defaults of its 
agents. Similarly, in Commercial and General Acceptance Limited v Nixon, in relation to s 85 
of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), (analogous to s 420A of the Corporations Law) Gibbs, 
CJ, with whom Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ agreed, stated that the duty to take reasonable 
care to ensure that the property was sold at market value was not discharged simply by 
delegating the duty to another “whether that other be an agent or an independent 
contractor".20 
With respect, the judicial statements in Jeogla and Florgale Uniforms that s 420A is ‘close to 
word perfect with’ and ‘analogous to’ the Queensland provision fail to appreciate or 
acknowledge the significance of the distinguishing language of s 85 evident throughout the 
judgments delivered by the High Court justices in CGA v Nixon.  That is, that s 85 imposes a 
duty to take reasonable care ‘to ensure’ that the property is sold at market value and that 
those words ‘to ensure’ required that the provision be interpreted in a manner which 
effectively guarantees performance of the duty by the mortgagee (even where agents are 
legitimately used to effect the sale).  
 
The Federal Court decision in Mijac Investments Pty Ltd v Graham (No.2) (2009) 72 ACSR 
684 (‘Mijac Investments’) is a similar demonstration of the influence of CGA v Nixon upon 
the authorities which are cited in support of a ‘strict liability’ application of s 420A.  Mijac 
Investments dealt with an application for orders for relief in respect of a sale of assets and 
undertaking by a mortgagee allegedly in breach of both its general law and statutory (s 420A) 
duties.  In an opening statement of relevant legal principles, Gordon J stated:  
 
In exercising the power of sale, a mortgagee is liable for the defaults of its agents: see 
Commercial and General Acceptance Ltd v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 508–16; 38 ALR 
225 at 237–44 ; [1981] HCA 70 (Nixon) per Aickin J; Goldcel Nominees Pty Ltd v Network 
Finance Ltd [1983] 2 VR 257 at 262; Nolan v MBF Investments Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 244 at 
[280]; Florgale Uniforms at [350]. That view is of course consistent with general agency 
principles: see Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; 
211 ALR 342 ; [2004] HCA 52 at [69]–[82]; Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 at 452–
4; 46 ALR 1 at 34–6 ; [1983] HCA 11; Combulk Pty Ltd v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1993) 
41 FCR 59 at 66–8; 113 ALR 214 at 220–3. As Gibbs CJ said in Nixon at CLR 498; 
ALR 229, in the context of a statutory duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the property 
was sold at market value, that duty is “not discharge[d] … simply by delegating the duty to 
another, whether that other be an agent or an independent contractor”. 21    
 
With respect, upon closer analysis of these two lines of authority referred to by Gordon J in 
Mijac Investments it is evident that:  
 
                                                 
20 Florgale Uniforms Pty Ltd (rec & mgr appt)(in liq) v Orders (2004) 11 VR 54 at [350] (Dodds-Streeton J). 
21 Mijac Investments Pty Ltd v Graham (No.2) (2009) 72 ACSR 684 at 694, [21]. 
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• In Goldcel Nominees Pty Ltd v Network Finance Ltd, Nolan v MBF Investments Pty 
Ltd22 and Florgale Uniforms, it was CGA v Nixon which was invariably cited as the 
principal authority in support of the proposition that the duty under s 420A cannot be 
delegated; and 
 
• The authorities enunciating ‘general agency principles’ were all contractual cases and 
therefore of questionable relevance or assistance in determining liability under a 
statutory duty for an agent’s acts or omissions.  It is difficult to see how the legal 
doctrine under which an agent binds a principal in contract has any applicability to 
the question of a controller’s responsibility for an agent’s default under s 420A.   
 
In Investec Bank (Australia) Ltd v Glodale Pty Ltd (2009) 24 VR 617 (‘Investec’) the 
Victorian Court of Appeal dealt with a claim for relief under both s 85 of the Queensland 
statute and s 420A.  It was asserted (and ultimately upheld) that the mortgagee bank’s agent 
had failed to engage a local real estate agent for the sale of North Queensland security 
property, which in turn meant that the mortgagee had failed to take reasonable care in 
ensuring that market value had been obtained.  The bank adopted the acts of the receivers, 
conceding that any finding that the receiver had not exercised reasonable care would be 
attributed to it.  In Investec the Court cited Fortson Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia (2008) 10 SASR 162 (‘Fortson’)23 as authority for the sweeping statement that, as 
regards s 420A and the Queensland provision (s 85(1)):  
 
Despite the reference in s 420A to “all” reasonable care, the duty under either provision 
should be regarded as the same.24 
 
In Fortson however, the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court did not consider 
or compare the respective duties under s 85 of the Queensland statute and s 420A in respect 
of the liability of a controller for the defaults of an agent.  The Court had merely applied CGA 
v Nixon insofar as the High Court decision illuminated the basic content of the duty of 
‘reasonable care’:  
 
The duty expressed in s 420A(1)(a) is a duty to take all reasonable care to sell the property for 
not less than market value. This duty is the same duty as the statutory duty imposed in some 
States upon mortgagees that requires them, when exercising the power of sale, to take 
reasonable care to ensure that the property is sold at market value. In Commercial and 
General Acceptance Ltd v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 the content of that duty was 
considered. It requires the mortgagee to put the property on the open market and bring it to 
the attention of potential purchasers by advertising and responding to all inquiries and 
expressions of interest: Commercial and General Acceptance Ltd v Nixon (at 495) per 
Gibbs CJ and (at 505) per Mason J; see also Emerson v Custom Credit Corporation Ltd 
[1994] 1 Qd R 516. That same duty is imposed upon a controller by s 420A(1)(a): Kyuss 
Express Pty Ltd v Sellers (2001) 37 ACSR 62 at [93]-[95].25 
                                                 
22 The decision at first instance in Nolan v MBF Investment Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 244 was overturned on 
appeal but the issue of liability for the defaults of an agent was not critical to the appeal: MBF Investments 
Pty Ltd v Nolan [2011] VSCA 114. 
23 Fortson Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia  (2008) 10 SASR 162 at 170. 
24 Investec Bank (Australia) Ltd v Glodale Pty Ltd (2009) 24 VR 617 at [42]. 
25 Fortson Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2008) 10 SASR 162 at [27] (Debelle J with whom Doyle 
CJ and Bleby J agreed).  
10 
 
Therefore, the broad comparative statement regarding s 85 and s 420A made by the 
Victorian Court of Appeal in Investec is of limited application.  It is respectfully contended 
that the duties under the two provisions are not ‘the same’ in every respect.   
In Investec the bank adopted the receiver’s conduct.  However, it is curious that no 
argument was made that it was the receiver’s Victorian adviser (a Melbourne agent and 
valuer) who was primarily at fault by failing to appoint an appropriate local real estate 
agent to sell the property, and that this omission was not something for which the receiver 
could (or should) be held responsible.  Could the receiver (bank) have argued that it was 
entitled to rely upon the advice and expertise of the professional service provider which it 
had reasonably engaged and deferred to?  This argument would have presented the Court 
with a genuine ‘strict liability’ scenario.  However, the judgments of both Pagone J (at first 
instance) and the Court of Appeal indicate that the receiver and bank were both aware of a 
suggestion by another valuer that a local agent should be appointed.26  This degree of 
personal culpability on the part of both the receiver and bank may explain why such an 
argument was not run at the trial.           
Commentary and international comparisons 
Ford’s, citing the accustomed authorities, states that:  
A controller will not perform the duty imposed by s 420A by simply delegating the duty to 
an agent: Jeogla Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1999) 150 FLR 
359; (2001) ANZ ConvR 298; [1999] NSWSC 563; BC990318 applying Commercial and 
General Acceptance Ltd v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491; 38 ALR 225; 56 ALJR 130.27 
Interestingly, O’Donovan states that if a controller’s agents are negligent the controller will 
also be liable for breach of duty, citing the Scottish (Court of Session) decision of Wilson v 
Dunbar Bank Plc [2006] CSOH 105 (‘Wilson’).28  Wilson dealt with a Scottish statute 
similar to s 420A(1)(b).  However, the Scottish provision was cast in the same, specific 
language which was critical to the High Court’s construction of the Queensland provision 
in CGA v Nixon – namely, that the creditor ‘take all reasonable steps to ensure that the 
price at which all or any of the subjects are sold is the best that can be reasonably 
obtained.’ 29   Indeed, the Court’s decision in Wilson was based in large part on the 
‘persuasive’ reasoning of the Australian judges in CGA v Nixon.30   
In New Zealand, s 19 of the Receiverships Act 1993 provides that a receiver who exercises 
a power of sale ‘owes a duty … to obtain the best price reasonably obtainable as at the time 
of sale’.31  The provision is not cast in terms of a duty to ‘take reasonable care’ and is of 
limited assistance in providing a comparative point of reference when construing s 420A, 
particularly in light of the fact that the New Zealand common law has remained in step 
                                                 
26 Glodale Pty Ltd v Investec Bank (Australia) Ltd [2007] VSC 276 at [18]-[19] (Pagone J); Investec (2009) 24 
VR 617 at [51]-[60] (Court of Appeal judgment). 
27 Austin R and Ramsay I, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (Lexisnexis Australia, subscription service) at 
[25.121], viewed 20 April 2012. 
28 O’Donovan Company Receivers and Administrators (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [11.3365], 
viewed 20 April 2012. 
29 Wilson v Dunbar Bank Plc [2006] CSOH 105 at [166]. 
30 Wilson v Dunbar Bank Plc [2006] CSOH 105 at [166]. 
31 See “Duty of a receiver selling property” (Part II (4) 26 “Receivers”), The Laws of New Zealand, LexisNexis 
NZ, Service No. 60 (30/6/2011) viewed 21 Nov 2011. 
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with the UK and not diverged in the same manner and direction as the Australian general 
law (discussed further below).32     
Conclusions upon the case law and commentary subsequent to CGA v Nixon  
Therefore, judicial statements to the effect that s 420A should be construed in the same 
manner as the Queensland provision should be treated with caution.  The absence of the 
words ‘to ensure’ from s 420A casts doubt upon the correctness of simply applying CGA v 
Nixon to determine a controller’s liability under s 420A for an agent’s carelessness.  
Equally, caution should be applied when considering the persuasive value of foreign 
authorities such as Wilson.  It could fairly be said that the authorities and commentary 
supporting a ‘strict liability’ interpretation of s 420A invariably hark back to the same 
authority (CGA v Nixon) which is arguably distinguishable on this very point. 
VI  The proper statutory construction of s 420A regarding controllers’ 
liability for agents’ carelessness 
 
Merely distinguishing CGA v Nixon and thereby concluding that s 420A does not impose 
‘strict liability’ is also too simplistic an analysis.  How then should s 420A be interpreted in 
the event that a mortgagor (or guarantor) seeks to hold a blameless controller responsible for 
an agent’s blunder?  If one adopts the approach proffered by Brennan J in CGA v Nixon, the 
question of whether a controller is strictly liable for an agent’s default is answered by a 
proper construction of s 420A upon its own terms:  
The question is not whether the mortgagee is negligent according to a common law 
standard in the appointment of a person to do what ought to be done to ensure a sale at 
market value. Nor is there a question of the mortgagee being held vicariously liable for 
another's breach of statutory duty (cf Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v 
Long (1957) 97 CLR 36) for the statute does not impose a duty upon a person other than 
the mortgagee. The question is simply whether the mortgagee has discharged by 
performance the duty which the statute imposes upon him.33 (emphasis added) 
Brennan J proceeded to construe the Queensland provision in this manner.  As discussed 
above, he (like the other members of the High Court) attached significance to the words ‘to 
ensure’ contained in the provision.   
 
It is interesting to compare Brennan J’s dicta with that of Aickin J (set out above), who stated 
that the statutory duty cannot be delegated to an agent any more than it can be delegated to an 
employee (declaring that a mortgagee would surely be liable for an employee’s negligent 
conduct of a sale).  Aickin J’s construction of s 85 certainly appears to be partly grounded in 
notions of vicarious liability.34  However, as Brennan J correctly observed, a controller (like 
any principal) cannot be ‘vicariously’ liable for the act or omission of an agent when the 
relevant duty is only imposed upon the principal.  Rather, the question is whether the 
controller has done what is required by the statute.   
 
                                                 
32 Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corp Ltd [1993] 3 All ER 626. 
33 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 525 (Brennan J). 
34 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 516 (Aickin J).  In summing up his judgment Aickin J stated that ‘there 
is nothing unusual in a principal being vicariously liable for the acts of his agent; indeed it is generally so’.  
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The Harmer Report background to s 420A: omission of the words ‘to ensure’ from the 
enacted provision 
 
The intention of the legislature must of course be construed through the language of s 420A 
itself.  The discussion above has referred to a small but important difference in language 
between the analogous Queensland provision and s 420A.  The significance of the seemingly 
innocuous words ‘to ensure’ is further borne out by a review of the process by which s 420A 
was enacted.     
 
It has been recognised that when construing s 420A ‘it is instructive to note how s 420A 
came to be inserted in the Corporations Act’.35  The genesis of s 420A was of course the 
1988 Harmer Report (ALRC Report 45 – General Insolvency Inquiry, 1988). The Draft 
Legislation in the Appendix to the Harmer Report contained provision ‘R6’ (the precursor to 
the ultimate s 420A) which was cast in the following terms:  
 
R6. (1) It is the duty of a receiver of property of a corporation or other person who has 
entered into possession or has assumed control of property of a corporation for the purpose of 
enforcing a charge to take reasonable care in the exercise of his or her powers.  
(2) In particular, that duty extends to taking reasonable care in the management of the 
property and, if the property is sold, to ensure that it is not sold at a price below the best price 
reasonably obtainable. (emphasis added) 
(3) ... 
 
The words ‘to ensure’ - pivotal to the decision in CGA v Nixon seven years earlier - were 
initially recommended but not ultimately retained when s 420A finally made its way into the 
Corporations Law (now the Corporations Act).  This curiosity was probably overlooked in 
the flurry of post-enactment litigation and commentary associated with issues such as the 
omission of an express remedy for breach of the provision and the introduction of the ‘market 
value’ concept.36  
 
The Explanatory Memorandum and second reading speech for the Corporate Law Reform 
Bill 1992 (which introduced s 420A) do not provide any reference or explanation which 
might assist in interpreting the provision in respect of this ‘strict liability’ question.  The 
Explanatory Memorandum does state that ‘proposed s 420A(1) will not affect any duties the 
controller may owe to others under the common law or otherwise’.37  However, confirming 
that the general law good faith duty co-exists with the heightened s 420A duty does not 
illuminate parliament’s intention vis a vis controllers’ responsibility for the failure of their 
agents to take all reasonable care.  
 
The ultimate omission of the words ‘to ensure’ from s 420A as enacted (and its implications 
for the construction of the provision vis a vis controllers’ responsibility for careless agents) is 
an issue which has remained under the radar of courts, commentators and stakeholders alike.    
 
Relevance of the ‘co-existing’ general law in construing s 420A 
 
                                                 
35 Ultimate Property Group v Lord (2004) NSWLR 646 at [51] (Young CJ in Eq). 
36 Similarly, an express remedy for breach had initially appeared in the draft legislation but did not appear in the 
enacted version of s 420A.  Conversely, the concept of ‘market value’ was not in the original draft legislation 
but did ultimately appear in the enacted s 420A.  
37 Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992 Explanatory Memorandum at [406].  
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Case law has now established that s 420A is not a codification of the general law duties of a 
mortgagee or receiver, but is rather an enhancement of the general law equitable remedies by 
the imposition of a higher statutory duty.38  The general law continues to apply alongside (or 
‘co-exist’ with) s 420A.39  It is relevant to the construction of s 420A that the preponderance 
of recent Australian authority has confirmed that the provision does not itself provide an 
independent cause of action (eg, breach of statutory duty).  Rather, s 420A extends the 
general law duty owed by a receiver such that the existing equitable remedies for a faulty or 
deficient exercise of the power of sale are enhanced and strengthened by reference to the 
higher duty (or test) established by s 420A.40 
 
In GE Capital Australia v Davis (2002) 180 FLR 250 (‘GE Capital’) Bryson J rejected a 
cross-claim by guarantors for damages for breach of s 420A (ie, a claim for damages for 
breach of statutory duty), stating that ‘the effect of s 420A(1) is to redefine the duty and what 
must be done to protect the corporation and its property when affected by exercise of a power 
of sale.’41  Bryson J stated that it was not the intention of the legislature that s 420A should 
confer any right or remedy on guarantors or other persons who involve themselves 
contractually in consequences of the exercise of the power of sale.  Rather, a guarantor is 
entitled to rely on the availability to the mortgagor of a remedy, whether it was the pre-
existing remedy under common law or the remedy now available to a mortgagor upon a 
breach of s 420A. 42  In short, the equitable remedies which were available prior to the 
enactment of s 420A (where there was a breach of the mortgagee’s duty to the mortgagor) are 
now tested by reference to whether there is a breach of s 420A.43      
 
In Ultimate Property Group Pty Ltd v Lord (2004) NSWLR 646 (‘Ultimate Property’) Young 
CJ in Eq diverged from Bryson J in GE Capital on the question of whether s 420A provides a 
private or independent right of action.44 However, it is the view of Bryson J in GE Capital 
which has generally found favour in other subsequent Victorian and New South Wales 
decisions.   
 
In Florgale Uniforms Dodds-Streeton J stated:  
Despite the similarity of his approach to s 420A, Young CJ in Eq appeared to accept that 
the section operates to vest a cause of action, whereas Bryson J considered that s 420A 
                                                 
38 See Klineberg T, ‘Section 420A in theory and practice: Clarifying guarantors’ rights and other remedies for 
breach’ (2011) 19 Insolvency Law Journal 142 at 148-150. 
39 Florgale Uniforms Pty Ltd (rec & mgr appt)(in liq) v Orders (2004) 11 VR 54 at [358] (Dodds-Streeton J).  A 
similar conclusion was also reached in relation to s 85 of the Queensland statute in Benzlaw & Associates Pty 
Ltd v Medi-Aid Centre Foundation [2007] QSC 233 at [143] (Muir J). 
40 Florgale Uniforms Pty Ltd (rec & mgr appt)(in liq) v Orders (2004) 11 VR 54 following Bryson J in GE 
Capital Australia v Davis (2002) 180 FLR 250.    
41 GE Capital Australia v Davis (2002) 180 FLR 250 at 266 (Bryson J). 
42 GE Capital Australia v Davis (2002) 180 FLR 250 at 266-267 (Bryson J). 
43 GE Capital Australia v Davis (2002) 180 FLR 250 at 275. Bryson J stated that ‘[t]he defendants have in my 
opinion no right to sue under s 420A themselves, the credit is equitable in nature, and unless they are allowed to 
rely on it as a set-off, their claimed right to have regard paid to it will not be recognised in these proceedings.  In 
these circumstances they ought in my opinion be allowed to raise it by way of set-off; subject however to the 
terms of the Guarantee and Indemnity’. Bryson J held that where mortgaged property has been sold at an 
actionable undervalue (ie, by sacrificing the mortgagor’s interest in the exercise of the power of sale), ‘the 
mortgagor’s remedy is to be credited compensation when accounts are taken of the mortgage debt.  Section 
420A(1) alters this scheme by inserting a more stringent rule, but does not otherwise change the scheme’.     
44 Ultimate Property Group Pty Ltd v Lord (2004) NSWLR 646 at 659 (Young CJ in Eq).  His Honour held that 
in his view the legislature intended there to be a private action for a breach of s 420A, namely equitable 
damages.   
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only contributed stringency to pre-existing rights of action, rather than creating 
independent new causes of action. In my opinion, Bryson J’s analysis of s 420A is 
persuasive. ….  The section does not vest an independent cause of action, but extends the 
duty owed by a controller, with the effect that all existing entitlements (including those of 
guarantors and collateral mortgagors) to equitable remedies in respect of a faulty or 
deficient exercise of the power of sale are enhanced and strengthened, by reference to the 
higher duty established by s 420A.45 
In Boman Irani & Ors v St George Bank Limited [2005] VSC 403 Whelan J stated:  
The enactment of s 420A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) has diminished the 
significance of the general law duty where what is in issue is the exercise of a power of 
sale.  Section 420A extends the general law duty owed by the mortgagee. The existing 
entitlements of guarantors and later chargees to equitable remedies in respect of any faulty 
or deficient exercise of the power of sale are enhanced and strengthened by the higher duty 
it establishes.46 
Whelan J referred to the alternative view espoused by Young CJ in Eq in Ultimate 
Property that s 420A creates an independent cause of action but, like Dodds-Streeton J in 
Florgale Uniforms, preferred the analysis of Bryson J in GE Capital.   
In Permanent Custodians Ltd v AGB Developments Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 540 Davies J 
also endorsed the dicta of Bryson J in GE Capital, rejecting a proposed cross-claim for 
breach of statutory duty (s 420A) as pleaded by guarantors against a mortgagee.  Davies J 
held that the pleaded cross-claim was misconceived.47        
 
The general law may ‘reinforce’ a court’s construction of the statutory duty 
 
As discussed above, in CGA v Nixon the High Court considered that its construction of s 85 
was ‘reinforced’ by the UK general law which cast the duty upon mortgagees at a similar 
standard to that imposed by the Queensland provision (ie, ‘reasonable care’).  In construing s 
85 of the Queensland statute the High Court focussed on the language of the provision (as 
discussed above) but also took some assurance in its conclusion from 19th century English 
decisions where courts were prepared to render mortgagees generally answerable for losses 
occasioned by their agents’ defaults.  As Mason J stated in CGA v Nixon:  
 
In ascertaining the content of the statutory statement of the duty it is legitimate to take into 
account what, according to judicial opinion, was the liability in equity of the mortgagee as 
principal for the default of his agent in the exercise of the power of sale. The verdict of 
authority was all one way — that the mortgagee was liable for the default of his agent. Stuart 
VC in Wolff v Vanderzee (1869) 20 LT 353 at 354; Kekewich J in Tomlin v Luce (1889) 41 
Ch D 573 at 575–6 and Cotton LJ on appeal (1889) 43 Ch D 191 at 194, and recently Cross 
LJ in Cuckmere Brick ([1971] 1 Ch at 973) have all stated that the mortgagee is so liable.48  
 
Mason J also stated that  
                                                 
45 Florgale Uniforms Pty Ltd (rec & mgr appt)(in liq) v Orders (2004) 11 VR 54 at 73. 
46 Boman Irani & Ors v St George Bank Limited [2005] VSC 403 at [142] (Whelan J). 
47 Bank of WA Ltd v Usalj [2010] NSWSC 991 at [19], [28] is another recent example of a guarantor having its 
cross-claim for damages for breach of s 420A struck out on the basis that ‘s 420A(1) does not confer any right 
or remedy on guarantors’. However, the guarantor was given a further opportunity to replead the cross-claim, 
raising equitable remedies. 
48 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 503. 
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s 85 was enacted after the Cuckmere Brick Case.  The language of s 85(1) is very similar to 
the language used there by Salmon LJ to describe the measure of the mortgagee’s duty.  It 
may be that the dicta in Cuckmere Brick that this duty was not avoided by selecting a 
competent agent were considered by the draftsman to be part of the general law.49    
 
Aickin J similarly stated:  
This conclusion is reinforced by the background of decisions on this subject. Although 
there is no direct decision, there is a series of statements in cases over a period of about 100 
years to the effect that a mortgagee is liable for a loss caused by the negligent conduct of an 
agent engaged by him to conduct a sale of the mortgaged property and there are no dicta to 
the contrary effect. In such circumstances it seems unlikely that the legislature would have 
intended to restrict the mortgagor's rights without expressing that intention in unequivocal 
terms.50 
However, if the words ‘to ensure’ had been absent from the Queensland provision, it is very 
much an open question as to whether the High Court in CGA v Nixon would have reached the 
same decision solely on the strength of these dated, UK general law authorities.  In CGA v 
Nixon Aickin J stated that the extent of a mortgagee’s responsibility for an agent was a 
question ‘which has not been the subject of any authoritative decision in Australia or in the 
United Kingdom’.51  The authorities identified by the High Court provided only persuasive 
guidance or ‘reinforcement’ of their preferred construction of the Queensland provision.  
 
The UK authorities relied upon by the High Court in CGA v Nixon (culminating in Cuckmere 
Brick) largely held that a mortgagee’s duty and liability was one of ‘reasonable care’ (akin to 
that owed in negligence). Despite the tortious terms in which the duty of care was enunciated 
in Cuckmere Brick, it is now accepted in the UK that the general law duties of a mortgagee or 
receiver are equitable and not founded in the law of negligence.52  This foundation in equity 
was also alluded to by Mason J in CGA v Nixon (quoted above).53 
 
However, since CGA v Nixon these UK authorities have been rejected in Australia so far as 
they impose upon mortgagees and receivers a general law duty of ‘reasonable care’.  
                                                 
49 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 505 (Mason J). 
50 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 508. 
51 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 506 (Aickin J referred to his same observation in ANZ Banking Group 
Ltd v Bangadilly Pastoral Co Pty Ltd (1978) 139 CLR 195). 
52  In Cuckmere Brick [1971] 1 Ch D 949, 966 Salmon LJ referred to the ‘proximity’ of mortgagee and 
mortgagor in a sale scenario and declared them to surely be ‘neighbours’. However, later in the same judgment 
(at 967) he also stated that courts had long regarded mortgagees to be ‘chargeable with the full value of the 
mortgaged property sold if, from want of due care and diligence, it has been sold at an undervalue’ and that it 
appeared that ‘many years before the modern development of the law of negligence, the courts of equity had laid 
down a doctrine in relation to mortgages which is entirely consonant with the general principles later evolved by 
the common law’.  This aspect of Salmon LJ’s judgment was specifically referred to by Aickin J in CGA v 
Nixon (at 513).  In Downsview Nominees Ltd & Anor v First City Corp Ltd & Anor [1993] 3 All ER 626 the 
Privy Council stated that ‘the general duty of care said to be owed by a mortgagee to subsequent incumbrancers 
and the mortgagor in negligence is inconsistent with the right of the mortgagee and the duties which the courts 
applying equitable principles have imposed on the mortgagee’. See also O’Donovan, Company Receivers and 
Managers (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [11.3310], viewed 20 April 2012.       
53 See above n 48. See also Werner C, ‘Mortgagees and Receivers Exercising Powers of Sale – An English and 
Australian Comparative Analysis’ (2011) 20 International Insolvency Review 75-90 (at 80) which discusses the 
Privy Council decision in Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation Ltd which confirmed that ‘the 
Cuckmere Brick duty is nevertheless an equitable one and is not founded in the law of negligence’.  
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Australian courts have favoured the principles laid down in Pendlebury v Colonial Mutual 
Life Assurance Society Ltd (1912) 13 CLR 676 (‘Pendlebury’).  A summary of the evolution 
of Australian jurisprudence in this regard can be found in the decision of Young CJ in Eq in 
Ultimate Property Group, in which His Honour concluded that 
 
authority compels me to say that there is no common law duty in negligence on a mortgagee 
in New South Wales which makes a mortgagee liable in common law damages if he fails to 
get a good price for the mortgaged property.54        
   
In Expo International Pty Ltd v Chant [1979] 2 NSWLR 820 (‘Expo International’) 
Needham J of the New South Wales Supreme Court also endorsed Pendlebury in determining 
that the duty owed by a receiver to a mortgagor at general law is one of good faith, not 
reasonable care.  In that case damages were awarded to the plaintiff company by virtue of the 
receiver’s failure to act in good faith and with regard for the interests of the mortgagor 
company.  While no High Court decision has definitively settled the issue, the predominant 
weight of Australian authority has endorsed Expo International and Pendlebury – that is, that 
a receiver need only exercise his/her powers in good faith and not needlessly sacrifice the 
interests of the mortgagor company.  The general law duties of a receiver when exercising a 
power of sale are analogous to those of a mortgagee.55 
 
Against this background it does appear incongruous that the UK authorities which 
‘reinforced’ the High Court’s decision in CGA v Nixon - and which consequently now affect 
the construction of s 420A - are representative of a ‘higher’ general law duty which has since 
been effectively rejected in Australia.   
 
What then do the leading Australian general law authorities enunciating the duty of 
mortgagees say about the liability of mortgagees (or receivers) for the acts or omissions of 
their agents?    
 
Judicial consideration of the responsibility of mortgagees/receivers for the acts and 
omissions of agents under the Australian general law (duty of good faith) 
 
Throughout the Pendlebury line of authorities (which have now come to represent the 
Australian general law position) there are in fact statements of support for a ‘strict liability’ 
approach to the mortgagee’s general law duty.   
 
In Pendlebury the mortgagee in fact adopted the acts of an employee who (without authority 
from his employer to so) defectively and inadequately advertised the property for sale and 
oversaw the conduct of a deficient auction.  Nevertheless, Griffith CJ stated: 
  
In the case of Tomlin v Luce (1889) 41 Ch D 573, Kekewich J, speaking of the liability of a 
mortgagee under such circumstances, said (p 575) –  
So long, however, as he selects agents presumably competent he cannot be made 
liable for their errors in judgment or in matters of detail not seriously affecting the 
success of the sale or the price realised. On the other hand, I think that if the 
mortgagee is guilty, directly or indirectly, of a serious blunder inducing a failure to 
sell, or a large diminution of the price realised, the mortgagor can hold him 
responsible for that, and it is no answer for him to say that the blunder was no fault 
                                                 
54 Ultimate Property Group Pty Ltd v Lord (2004) NSWLR 646 at 651 (Young CJ in Eq).  
55 Deangrove Pty Ltd (recrs & mgrs apptd) v Buckby (2006) 56 ACSR 630 at [44] (Branson J).  
17 
 
of his own, but was that of an agent in whom he properly placed implicit 
confidence.  
The court of Appeal (Cotton, Bowen and Fry LJJ), held that the mortgagee was liable for 
any loss occasioned by the mistake which had in fact been made, but dissented from the 
measure of damages adopted by Kekewich J (footnotes omitted).56 
 
However, as demonstrated by a recent Full Federal Court decision (discussed below), this 
statement of principle from Tomlin v Luce is ambiguous and vulnerable to differing 
interpretations.  
 
The decision of McCelland CJ in Eq in Hawkesbury Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Custom 
Credit Corporation Ltd (1994) 8 BPR 15,581 dealt with a mortgagee sale prior to the 
enactment of s 420A.  McLelland CJ was required to ‘consider the nature and extent of the 
relevant obligations owed by a mortgagee to a mortgagor when exercising the mortgagee’s 
power of sale, independently of such statutory provisions’. 57   His Honour held that the 
mortgagee was subject to the equitable obligations considered by the High Court in 
Pendlebury – that is, that ‘a mortgagee must act in good faith, which involves an obligation to 
deal fairly with the interests of the mortgagor, which in turn involves an obligation to refrain 
from acting in wilful or reckless disregard of those interests’.58   His Honour then considered 
a submission by the plaintiffs that insofar as any such failures involved acts or omissions of 
the mortgagee’s agents, those acts or omissions should be attributed to the mortgagee.  His 
Honour held:  
 
In my opinion, this submission is correct. A mortgagee must, as between itself and the 
mortgagor, accept responsibility for the acts or omissions of agents engaged by it to perform 
functions on its behalf which affect the interests of the mortgagor. In Commercial and 
General Acceptance v Nixon … an analogous question arose in relation to defaults by an 
agent of the mortgagee in respect of the statutory duty ‘to take reasonable care to ensure that 
the property is sold at the market value’ which is imposed in Queensland upon a mortgagee 
by s85(1) of the Property Law Act 1974 of that State. Mason J said (at 503): ‘In ascertaining 
the content of the statutory statement of the duty it is legitimate to take into account what, 
according to judicial opinion, was the liability in equity of the mortgagee as principal for the 
default of his agent in the exercise of the power of sale. The verdict of authority was all one 
way - that the mortgagee was liable for the default of his agent. Stuart VC in Wolff v 
Vanderzee [(1869) 20 LT 353 at 354]; Kekewich J in Tomlin v Luce [(1889) 41 Ch D 573 at 
575-576]; and Cotton LJ on appeal [(1889) 43 Ch D 191 at 194], and recently Cross LJ in 
Cuckmere Brick [1971 1 Ch at 973] have all stated that the mortgagee is so liable.’ All 
members of the Court relied on those authorities under the general law in holding that for the 
purposes of s 85 of the Queensland Act, as between the mortgagee and the mortgagor, the 
mortgagee must be held responsible for the acts and omissions of its agent.59   
 
Again however, this dicta does not take matters very far.  McLelland CJ simply drew upon 
CGA v Nixon which is a less than authoritative decision on this point (for the reasons 
explained above).  With respect, the High Court’s construction of the text of the Queensland 
provision was ‘reinforced’ by (but not reliant upon) the general law authorities discussed.        
 
                                                 
56 Pendlebury v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1912) 13 CLR 676 at 684 (Griffith CJ). 
57 Hawkesbury Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Custom Credit Corporation Ltd (1994) 8 BPR 15,581 at 15,582. 
58 Hawkesbury Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Custom Credit Corporation Ltd (1994) 8 BPR 15,581 at 15,583. 
59 Hawkesbury Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Custom Credit Corporation Ltd (1994) 8 BPR 15,581 at 15,584. 
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In Carver v Westpac Banking Corp [2002] NSWSC 431 Austin J of the New South Wales 
Supreme Court considered the validity of the exercise of a power of sale by a mortgagee.  His 
Honour stated that the following was one of the ‘incidents of the mortgagee’s duty of good 
faith’: 
 
The mortgagee cannot discharge its duty by delegating the exercise of the power of sale to an agent 
(such as a real estate agent), since the duty requires the mortgagee not only to select a competent 
contractor but also to give adequate instructions, and to exercise some surveillance over the contractor 
or to inspect the work he is doing: Commercial and General Acceptance Ltd v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 
491, 498 per Gibbs CJ, 500 per Mason J ...60  
 
This is an interesting interpretation of the ratio of Gibbs CJ and Mason J in CGA v Nixon.  
This characterisation of the general law duty – ie, requiring something more than ‘mere 
delegation’ but stopping short of ‘strict liability’ - is similar to the construction of s 420A 
ultimately contended by this paper.  With respect however, Austin J’s statement appears to 
draw upon the CLR editorial head note of CGA v Nixon and is arguably something of an 
embellishment of the dicta of Gibbs CJ and Mason J.  While the judgments of Gibbs CJ and 
Mason J in CGA v Nixon clearly construed the s 85(1) duty as requiring more than ‘simple 
delegation’ (such construction being reinforced by the UK common law), their judgments 
were not prescriptive in terms of what will be sufficient to discharge the duty.  Gibbs CJ and 
Mason J did not go so far as to state that the s 85 duty (or indeed the general law duty) could 
or would be positively discharged by a mortgagee undertaking adequate supervision or 
‘surveillance’, such that the mortgagee would be absolved of liability for any defaults which 
regardless may be committed by an agent.  Mason J’s judgment, like so many others 
addressing this issue, did not make a finding or statement of general principle as to whether a 
blameless mortgagee will always be liable under the Queensland statutory or general law 
duty for all and any defaults of an agent or contractor (ie, strict liability).  Furthermore, 
Austin J’s reference to CGA v Nixon makes no mention of the remaining three High Court 
justices who were evidently swayed by the dicta in Cuckmere Brick which effectively casts 
UK general law strict liability upon mortgagees for their agents’ conduct.   
 
More recently, in Upton v Tasmanian Perpetual Trustees Ltd (2007) 158 FCR 118 (‘Upton’) 
the Full Federal Court held that the Tasmanian (property law) statutory duty upon mortgagees 
merely restates the common law duty of good faith ‘as it is generally accepted to be in 
Australia’.61  Graham J discussed at some length the Australian general law authorities since 
Forsyth v Blundell (1973) 129 CLR 477 and concluded that the  
 
proper approach to the determination of a mortgagee’s duty when exercising a power of sale, 
absent any relevant statutory provision, is to be discerned from the judgements in Pendlebury 
and those passages in the subsequent High Court cases which have elucidated the relevant 
principle as it is expounded in Pendlebury.62   
 
Graham J ultimately adopted the ‘summation of the relevant test’ of Needham J in Porter v 
Associated Securities Ltd (1976) 1 BPR 9279 and Expo International – namely, that a 
receiver or mortgagee ‘is not liable to answer to the mortgagor for losses caused by negligent 
                                                 
60 Carver v Westpac [2002] NSWSC 431 at [13].  Austin J’s judgment at first instance was affirmed on appeal.  
61 Upton v Tasmanian Perpetual Trustees Ltd (2007) 158 FCR 118 at [23]-[27].  The statutory duty in question 
was s 78 of the Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas).   
62 Upton v Tasmanian Perpetual Trustees Ltd (2007) 158 FCR 118 at [82]. 
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performance of bona fides acts’ and that the task of the court is to ‘ascertain whether the 
defendant wilfully or recklessly sacrificed the interests of the plaintiff’.63    
 
More notably, against the background of the ‘uncertainty which has existed as to the correct 
test to be applied and the nuances attending the requirement of “good faith”’, Graham J 
proceeded to set out a ‘series of propositions that may be gleaned from Pendlebury and the 
subsequent High Court cases’.64  His Honour set out ‘guidelines’ which could also be gleaned 
from Pendlebury ‘as to conduct which would be consistent with a proper application of the 
relevant principles’.65 Two of the guidelines His Honour laid down were:  
 
(b) If the mortgagee selects a presumably competent agent, the mortgagee cannot be 
made liable for errors in judgment or in matters of detail not seriously affecting the 
success of the sale or the price realised (see Griffith CJ in Pendlebury at 684.1).  
… 
(h) Unfairness amounting to lack of good faith may be evidenced by a failure on the 
part of an auctioneer to bring salient advantages to the attention of those attending 
the mortgagee sale (per Barton J in Pendlebury at 698.9).66 
 
The first of these two ‘guidelines’ is clearly drawn from the dicta of Kekewich J in the 19th 
century UK authority of Tomlin v Luce which was also endorsed by Griffith CJ in Pendlebury 
(a lengthier extract of the dicta of Kekewich J is set out above).  Given the ambiguous nature 
of this specific dictum of Kekewich J, it is unclear in Upton if Graham J was purporting to 
suggest that Tomlin v Luce militates against (at least to some extent) a ‘strict liability’ 
application of the general law, ‘good faith’ duty.  Such an inference would appear at odds 
with the manner in which Tomlin v Luce was cited in CGA v Nixon, Pendlebury and indeed 
the landmark UK authority of Cuckmere Brick (ie, in favour of a strict liability approach). 
 
It is difficult to rationalise the dicta of Kekewich J in Tomlin v Luce because it appears to call 
for an assessment of the degree or materiality of damage in determining whether a mortgagee 
should be strictly liable for an agent’s error.  Plainly this is an inadequate test or legal 
touchstone for the imposition of liability for another’s wrong.  However, the dicta of Graham 
J in Upton may indicate a modicum of Australian judicial support for the view that there is no 
general law duty on the part of a mortgagee to ‘ensure’ that good faith is always exercised by 
an agent as well as the mortgagee itself.   
 
In McCourt v National Australia Bank Ltd (No.2) [2010] WASC 151 (‘McCourt’) Tomlin v 
Luce was cited in support of a submission that a mortgagee had breached its duty of good 
faith by reason of both a defective valuation prepared by a professional valuer for the 
mortgagee and statements made by an auctioneer during the conduct of the auction.  The 
allegations of a lack of good faith were rejected in merit and substance.  However, McCourt 
is notable in that it indicates that Tomlin v Luce (as approved in Pendlebury) remains a 
legitimate authority upon which mortgagors continue to rely to render a mortgagee 
                                                 
63 Upton v Tasmanian Perpetual Trustees Ltd (2007) 158 FCR 118 at [83] (Graham J); Expo International Pty 
Ltd v Chant [1979] 2 NSWLR 820 at 835. 
64 Upton v Tasmanian Perpetual Trustees Ltd (2007) 158 FCR 118 at [86]. 
65 Upton v Tasmanian Perpetual Trustees Ltd (2007) 158 FCR 118 at [87]. 
66 Upton v Tasmanian Perpetual Trustees Ltd (2007) 158 FCR 118 at [87]. 
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responsible for the faults of an agent or expert adviser.  McCourt also illustrates how the 
‘strict liability’ question surrounding s 420A can arise in circumstances beyond mere 
deficiencies in an agent’s advertising campaign.  If the scenario in McCourt had involved a 
corporate (rather than individual) mortgagor, the mortgagee would have been a ‘controller’ 
and subject to s 420A, which in turn would have directly posed the question as to whether s 
420A should be afforded a ‘strict liability’ construction.    
 
Conclusions upon the Australian general law  
 
To the extent that the Australian general law may be relevant to the construction of s 420A, 
the primary authorities on the question of mortgagee/receiver responsibility for agents are 
still very much rooted in the UK general law.  Throughout the Australian general law there is 
evidence of judicial support for holding a mortgagee responsible for the acts or omissions of 
its agent (as an incident of the equitable duty).  However, given the dated and ambiguous 
nature of the UK authorities on which this element of the Australian general law is based, the 
position cannot be regarded as beyond debate.   
 
It might still be contended that in construing s 420A it remains appropriate to pay attention to 
the UK general law which couches its duty upon mortgagees and receivers in very similar 
terms (ie, to take ‘reasonable care’).  However, in light of the development of the Australian 
general law towards a ‘good faith’ duty, this approach would promote a strained construction 
of the provision.  What has changed since CGA v Nixon is that Australian authorities are now 
all but settled that the general law duty in Australia is one of ‘good faith’ and not the UK 
‘reasonable care’ standard.  In Australia, s 420A clearly operates to extend (but not replace) a 
‘good faith’ test with a higher, ‘reasonable care’ test.  Even assuming that under the 
Australian general law a mortgagee or receiver will always be responsible for an agent’s 
default, prior to s 420A’s enactment Australian controllers could only ever be responsible for 
their agents’ mala fides or wilful recklessness.   
 
It is contended that a court should be slow to accept a construction of s 420A which would 
further render a controller strictly liable for an agent’s mere negligence in the absence of 
clear statutory language evincing such an intention.  In CGA v Nixon the majority of the High 
Court found that the Queensland provision was indeed cast in language evincing that 
intention (ie, the words ‘to ensure’).  If the Queensland provision was devoid of that language 
(as s 420A is today) it is doubtful whether the High Court would arrive at the same result 
solely on the faith of general law authorities. 
 
However, some recent UK authorities remain noteworthy for their articulation of the 
equitable basis of the general law duty and the policy grounds in favour of holding controllers 
strictly liable for their agents’ defaults.   
 
VII  Recent UK authorities and policy considerations: If a controller is not 
strictly liable, what is the mortgagor’s remedy? 
 
Aside from Cuckmere Brick, the current state of the relevant UK general law is reflected in 
the Court of Appeal decisions in Medforth v Blake [1999] 3 All ER 97 (‘Medforth’) and Raja 
v Austin Gray (A Firm) [2002] EWCA Civ 1965 (‘Raja’).  The primary facts in Raja are not 
unlike McCourt (discussed above) and demonstrate again how the strict liability question 
may arise in practice.              
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Medforth was a case dealing with alleged mismanagement of a pig-farming business by a 
receiver.  The Court of Appeal confirmed that, subject to the primary duty of the receiver to 
bring about the repayment of the appointor’s debt, ‘the receiver owes a duty to manage the 
property with due diligence’.67  The leading judgment of Sir Richard Scott V-C also provided 
an instructive discussion of how a receiver’s general duties are grounded in equity and not the 
common law (negligence):  
 
The duties imposed on a mortgagee in possession, and on a mortgagee exercising his powers 
whether or not in possession, were introduced in order to ensure that a mortgagee dealt fairly 
and equitably with the mortgagor. The duties of a receiver towards the mortgagor have the 
same origin. They are duties in equity imposed in order to ensure that a receiver, while 
discharging his duties to manage the property with a view to repayment of the secured debt, 
nonetheless in doing so takes account of the interests of the mortgagor and others interested in 
the mortgaged property. These duties are not inflexible. What a mortgagee or a receiver must 
do to discharge them depends upon the particular facts of the particular case.  
... 
And the duty in equity appropriate to have been owed by a mortgagee selling in 1888 is not 
necessarily of the same weight as the duty appropriate to have been owed by a mortgagee 
selling in 1967. Equity is at least as flexible as the common law in adjusting the duties owed 
so as to make them fit the requirements of the time.68      
 
The ‘flexible’ and evolving nature of the equitable basis of the general law duty described in 
Medforth may be something to which Australian courts will have regard in determining 
whether to afford s 420A a strict liability construction (to the extent that the general law is 
seen as relevant to the construction exercise).  A strict liability operation of s 420A would put 
receivers and mortgagees in unenviable (and arguably unjust) predicaments when seeking to 
act prudently and diligently in utilising agents or professional, expert advice.      
 
Raja addressed a case of an alleged negligent valuation for which the mortgagor sued the 
valuer directly.  The Court rejected the notion that the valuer could be sued by the mortgagor 
for a number of reasons, one of which was the fact that the mortgagor had an adequate 
remedy against the receivers for the ‘negligence’ of the valuer.  Clarke LJ endorsed the strict 
liability of UK mortgagees and receivers:  
In paragraph 7–043 the editors of Lightman and Moss [‘The Law of Receivers and 
Administrators of Companies’, Third Edition] provide what to my mind are convincing 
reasons for adopting Cross LJ's approach: “The approach adopted by Cross LJ creates a form 
of strict liability on the mortgagee. His duty of care to sell at the best price reasonably 
obtainable is not delegable in the sense that he can avoid or perform his duty merely by 
appointing a reputable agent to conduct the sale, but extends to ensuring that reasonable care 
is taken by any agent or professional adviser employed by him in the sale. The extension of 
his duty may be an accident of history, but it promotes justice for the mortgagor who is 
thereby saved from the invidious, and often difficult, task of apportioning blame between the 
mortgagee and his agents and can also claim credit for any loss when settling accounts with 
the mortgagee. Moreover, the mortgagee can be assumed to be better placed to know the facts 
relating to a claim against the agent, is frequently in a better financial position to pursue the 
claim, and ultimately it must be remembered that it was the mortgagee who chose the agent 
who was later negligent. Once the special rule applicable to mortgagees is accepted, there is 
no sufficient reason to distinguish the position of the mortgagee and the receiver, and it would 
therefore appear that a receiver is subject to a like strict liability in respect of disposals. After 
                                                 
67 Medforth v Blake [1999] 3 All ER 97 at 111 (Sir Richard Scott V-C). 
68 Medforth v Blake [1999] 3 All ER 97 at 110-111. 
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Medforth it remains to be seen whether similarly strict principles will be applied to the 
negligence of agents in situations other than disposals of the charged property.”  I agree.69 
In light of the mortgagor’s clear right of recourse against the receivers, the Court was not 
prepared to entertain a duplication of remedies.  Significantly, the Court also rejected the 
alleged duty of care said to be owed by the valuer to the mortgagor for want of sufficient 
proximity or assumption of responsibility.  This aspect of Raja is consistent with cases such 
as Medforth and Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corp Ltd [1993] 3 All ER 62670 
which have rejected the notion that a mortgagee or receiver owes a duty of care in negligence 
because such a duty is inherently inconsistent with a mortgagee acting in its own interests to 
enforce the security (including through a receiver).  It is difficult to see how an agent or 
expert adviser (such as a valuer) engaged by a mortgagee or receiver could owe a duty of care 
based on negligence when no such duty in negligence is owed by the mortgagee or receiver 
itself.   
 
In the UK, Raja endorses a strong policy rationale for upholding the strict liability of 
mortgagees and receivers for their agents’ acts or omissions.  In construing s 420A it is 
possible that a court would see some similar policy justification for rendering a controller 
strictly liable for the faults of an agent or expert adviser, leaving the controller to pursue its 
remedy (in negligence or contract) against the careless agent/expert.  In Australia however, 
the essential point remains that prior to the enactment of s 420A mortgagors only had a cause 
of action where ‘good faith’ was found wanting on the part of mortgagees and receivers (or 
on the part of their agents, assuming that Tomlin v Luce has always represented the general 
law in Australia).  In that context again, it is contended that the imperative of preserving the 
mortgagor’s remedy (by imposing strict liability upon a controller) is not as compelling in 
Australia as it is in the UK.      
 
VIII Tortious guidance: The High Court’s aversion to ‘non-delegable’ 
duties and de facto ‘vicarious liability’ 
 
As identified by Brennan J in CGA v Nixon, an agent can never be liable for a breach of s 
420A given that the provision imposes the duty on a ‘controller’71 and no one else.  However, 
when interpreting a statutory duty imposing a ‘reasonable care’ standard (albeit actionable in 
equity and not tort) the High Court’s recent approach to tortious ‘non-delegable’ duties offers 
possible guidance, context and insight to the statutory construction exercise.   
 
The classic ‘non-delegable’ duty is one under which the person charged with the duty can 
delegate its performance, but will still be responsible for the delegate’s failure to meet the 
requisite standard of care required by the statute.  Thus, it is the ultimate responsibility for 
performance which is ‘non-delegable’, not the actual performance. Non-delegable duties have 
                                                 
69 Raja v Austin Gray (A Firm) [2002] EWCA Civ 1965 at [34]-[35].   
70 In Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corp Ltd [1993] 3 All ER 626 at 637 Lord Templeman stated: ‘Their 
Lordships consider that it is not possible to measure a duty of care in relation to a primary objective which is 
quite inconsistent with that duty of care.’.  
71 It is noteworthy in passing that in Mijac Investments (2009) 72 ACSR 684 Gordon J appeared to conclude that 
a director (acting for and on behalf of a corporation) can be a ‘controller’ under ss 9 and 420A.  The 
implications of this finding are potentially significant but beyond the scope of this paper.    
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usually been held to apply in special cases (eg, employer/employee, hospital/patient) and 
have also been described as ‘vicarious liability in sheep’s clothing’.72  
 
A construction of s 420A which would hold a controller ‘strictly liable’ for all acts or 
omissions of an agent would be tantamount to a ‘non-delegable’ duty.  The implications of 
such a construction could be seen to be harsh where, for example, a receiver considers it 
diligent and prudent to seek the advice of an expert only then to be rendered liable for relying 
on that expert’s advice which - unbeknown to the receiver – was negligent.  Should a 
controller, no matter how blameless, always be liable for the failure by an agent or contractor 
to exercise reasonable care?  As discussed above, there is a policy argument to render a 
controller strictly liable under s 420A so that the mortgagor does not have to apportion blame 
between the controller and the adviser (leaving the controller to seek damages from its agent 
or adviser).  However, it could be seen as unfair to expect a controller to respond to a claim 
that the advice of its engaged professional adviser was ‘negligent’ when that adviser is an 
independent contractor over which the mortgagee or receiver has little or no effective control.  
The specialised or esoteric nature of the matters relevant to such an alleged breach of s 420A 
would be the very reason the adviser was engaged by the controller in the first place.  The 
controller would very likely have to retain yet another expert to advise upon the alleged 
carelessness of its first expert.       
 
In Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery (2007) 230 CLR 22 (‘Leichhardt’) the High 
Court determined that a local council (a roads authority under state legislation) did not owe a 
non-delegable duty of care to road users.  The essential question in the case was whether the 
council was responsible for the negligence of a contractor engaged by the council to carry out 
footpath work.  Gleeson CJ discussed the relevant statutory scheme in terms which might be 
considered relevant to a future court’s construction of the s 420A duty:  
 
It is consistent with that statutory scheme to conclude that there is a duty in a roads authority 
to take reasonable care to prevent physical injury to a person such as the respondent from the 
carrying out of road works. It is also consistent with the statutory scheme to conclude that, if 
an independent contractor is engaged to perform such works, the roads authority remains 
under a "personal" duty to take reasonable care to prevent such injury, and that such duty is 
not discharged merely by exercising care in the selection of the contractor. Reasonable care 
on the part of the roads authority may well involve a certain level of scrutiny of the 
contractor's plans and supervision of the contractor's activities. It is a different thing to say 
that the legislation imposes, or is consistent with the imposition, of a duty to ensure that no 
employee of the independent contractor act carelessly. (Gleeson CJ’s own emphasis)73             
Gleeson CJ then discussed the severe implications and consequences of non-delegable 
duties:   
To speak of a local council having a duty to ensure that such an apparently low-level and 
singular act of carelessness does not occur is implausible. It is one thing to find fault on the 
part of council officers where there has been a failure to exercise reasonable care in 
supervising the work of a contractor, or in approving a contractor's plans and system of 
work. It is another thing to attribute to the council a legal duty of care which obliges the 
council to do the impossible: to ensure that no employee of the contractor behaves 
carelessly. The problem is even more acute if the source of this duty of care is said to be 
                                                 
72 Corkhill A, ‘Vicarious liability in sheep’s clothing? Non-delegable duties of care in Leichardt Municipal 
Council v Montgomery’ (2007) 15 Torts Law Journal 111.  
73 Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery (2007) 230 CLR 22 at [22] (Gleeson CJ). 
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found in statute. One of the things that is special about this duty is that it is a duty to do the 
impossible. That is unlikely to have been intended by the legislature.74   
These observations by the High Court are pertinent to the construction of s 420A.  It is 
contended that it is unlikely that the legislature intended that controllers are duty-bound ‘to 
ensure’ that no engaged agent or contractor ever behaves carelessly.  Section 420A clearly 
imposes a personal duty on a controller which requires more than ‘mere delegation’ to (or 
engagement of) a competent agent or contractor.  The provision clearly requires a 
reasonable degree of supervision, scrutiny and oversight of any agent or expert involved in 
the process of exercising a power of sale.  However, s 420A does not evince a clear 
legislative intention to make blameless controllers liable for every conceivable blunder of 
their agents or advisers.     
IX  Agents, real estate agents, experts and advisers 
Judicial consideration of the role of agents in the context of s 420A has sometimes appeared 
to lose sight of the fact that real estate or property agents are not usually ‘agents’ in the entire 
or true legal sense.  Real estate or property agents largely serve something of an introductory 
role and do not ordinarily possess the power to contract for and on behalf of their 
principals.75   
 
In the course of a controller exercising a power of sale, real estate agents could be acting as 
mere representative agents or ‘mouthpieces’ at one level, while acting as contractors or 
professional advisers in other contexts.  Where real estate agents prepare and place 
advertisements for and on behalf of controllers, the advertisements (and their content) will 
usually be attributed to the controller.76  In the case of ‘regular’ property sales, the authorities 
are clear that controllers cannot absolve themselves of responsibility for adequately 
advertising the property and ensuring that instructions to agents are carried out so that the 
property is adequately brought to market.  This degree of supervision and scrutiny is 
consistent with a construction of s 420A which (justifiably) requires more than ‘mere 
delegation’, but stops short of imposing ‘strict liability’.      
 
However, in the case of ‘niche’ property or irregular sales (or other special circumstances) 
expert agents may be required to provide expert advice on, say, appropriate marketing 
strategies.  The role of an agent in this context is beyond that of a mere ‘go between’ or 
‘representative’ agent and extends to providing specialist, professional advice and services to 
a controller who may be unfamiliar with the relevant market or features of a particular asset.  
In these instances, it is contended that the appropriate (and just) construction of s 420A is that 
a diligent and prudent controller should not be strictly liable for the diligent and reasonable 
reliance upon the advice of a specialist, professional ‘agent’ where that advice later proves to 
be negligent.     
 
X  Conclusion 
 
                                                 
74 Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery (2007) 230 CLR 22 at [23] (Gleeson CJ). 
75 Petersen v Moloney (1951) 84 CLR 91 at 94-95; Fisher S, Agency Law (Butterworths, Australia 2000) at 
[12.8.1]. 
76 A principal will be answerable for the content of advertisements and other representations made by an agent 
engaged for the purposes of selling property: Sydney Harbour Casino Properties Pty Ltd v Colluzi & Anor 
[2002] NSWCA 74.  
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The task of construing s 420A to determine the scope of liability of controllers for the 
negligence of their agents (or experts) requires traversing a complex legal landscape of 
statutory and general law tests and reconciling equitable doctrines with tortious notions of 
‘reasonable care’ and ‘non-delegable duties’.  This question of statutory construction has not 
received detailed or considered judicial attention, largely because CGA v Nixon has been 
generously (or superficially) applied to s 420A despite a material difference in the language 
of the specific provision which concerned the High Court in that case.  When the ‘strict 
liability’ question has presented itself to Australian courts, the opportunity for authoritative 
judicial reasoning has been lost because controllers either have adopted the acts or omissions 
of their agents (as in Pendlebury and Investec) or have been personally culpable at some level 
(as in Jeogla and possibly also Investec). 
 
Cases such as McCourt and Raja demonstrate that this open question of statutory 
interpretation of s 420A is far from academic.  The strict liability issue surrounding s 420A is 
not only relevant to advertising campaigns conducted by real estate agents on behalf of 
controllers, but also extends to expert advice obtained by a controller from any professional 
adviser be it property agent, valuer, accountant or lawyer.  The distinction between a 
‘representative’ agent and an expert or professional adviser may well affect the court’s 
approach in any given set of circumstances.      
 
In the final analysis, despite the context provided by the general law it is contended that the 
text of s 420A should be paramount in determining whether the legislature intended that 
controllers should be exposed to such a significant and strict liability.  An analysis of CGA v 
Nixon, the background to the enactment of s 420A and the High Court’s approach to tortious 
non-delegable duties all demonstrate that the words ‘to ensure’ (and their absence from s 
420A) carry significant meaning. 
 
If the same facts in CGA v Nixon arose again today in respect of a corporate mortgagor, one 
could legitimately argue that a ‘strict liability’ application of s 420A would not be necessary 
to render the controller liable.  The mortgagee in CGA v Nixon was not entirely blameless.77  
The lack of supervision evident in that case would arguably leave a controller short of what is 
required by s 420A without a strict liability construction of the provision.  Section 420A 
clearly imposes a personal duty on controllers to do more than merely exercise care in their 
selection of an agent or contractor.  Reasonable and diligent supervision and scrutiny of the 
work of agents will continue to be required of controllers in order to discharge their s 420A 
duty.  This much has never been controversial.  However, it is another thing altogether to 
interpret s 420A as requiring a controller to effectively guarantee a ‘negligence-free zone’.   
 
It is contended that section 420A does not require controllers to ‘ensure that reasonable care 
is taken’ in every aspect of the exercise of a power of sale.  When a controller reasonably 
engages an expert adviser in the course of selling security property and that controller 
reasonably and diligently (but not slavishly) relies upon that professional or expert advice, the 
controller’s duty under s 420A should stand fulfilled.  Section 420A should not be construed 
as imposing upon controllers a duty to do the impossible.   
 
 
 
                                                 
77 CGA v Nixon (1981) 152 CLR 491 at 500 (Mason J).  The mortgagee issued instructions to the agent as to the 
advertising required, but evidently did not ensure that those instructions had been followed.    
